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Commentaries
from the Israeli press and leading Israeli commentators beginning with this
piece by leading Israeli security and defense commentator, Alex
Fishman:
MAKING AN OFFER
Yedioth Ahronoth, 20 Oct, Alex Fishman
The explosion between Netanyahu and
Obama over the Iranian nuclear issue appears today to be
inevitable.
The Americans reported to top Israeli
officials about the Iranian opening offer, which was substantively different
from anything that we’ve seen to date. That report was received with mixed
feelings. On the one hand, even the Israeli establishment admits that the
Iranian approach—as it was presented in Geneva—is new and interesting. On the
other hand, officials in the prime minister’s inner circle harbor a deep
concern, one which is based on information, that the American president is going
to be prepared to ease sanctions on Iran even before the talks have been
completed.
And so, while Netanyahu has been speaking about the need to
continue and even to stiffen the sanctions, at least until a satisfactory
agreement is signed with the Iranians, the Americans are already talking
publicly about freeing Iranian assets in the United States and in other Western
countries. There has been talk in the corridors of the administration in
Washington about easing sanctions that pertain to Iranian
oil.
Israeli officials admit that if the
ideas that the Iranians have put on the table are just their opening positions,
as befits seasoned traders, then there is an opening here for a solution that
Israel will be able to live with. But if Iran succeeds in maneuvering the West
so that its opening position becomes the end result of the negotiations, that
would be catastrophic from Israel’s perspective. It is probably very reasonable
to assume that the Prime Minister’s Bureau is already sharpening the swords of
Israel’s friends in Congress.
On the eve of the talks in Geneva,
Israeli security officials cited a series of signs that would indicate whether
the process was serious this time. All of those signs appeared: there was a direct American-Iranian meeting; teams of
professionals were formed to work on the ideas that were raised in the first
meeting; a team will be formed to prepare for the next meeting, which is to be
held as soon as early November. The Iranians didn’t waste time with
interpreters; they simply chose to speak in English. They even asked for an end
date for the talks: in one year.
The Iranians showed willingness to make
concessions on two central issues: the production of nuclear fuel and increased
inspection on production. They are prepared to show flexibility on the
production of enriched uranium by means of centrifuges and converting it [into
fuel rods], and they have agreed to relinquish the irradiated fuel in the
plutonium plant in Arak. They are not prepared, at least not in the current
stage of talks, to give up their production infrastructure. The nuclear facilities will continue to operate, but the
Iranians will allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to visit them
so as to ensure that they are not being used for military
purposes.
If Iran meets its commitments, the production of an Iranian
nuclear bomb will be delayed until an unknown date. But since the Iranian
interest to become a nuclear power hasn’t changed in the Rouhani era, one needs
to expect that any such agreement will be temporary. If nothing is done to
dismantle the infrastructure that produces the nuclear fuel, Iran will be able
to expel the IAEA inspectors at a time of its own choosing and have a nuclear
bomb within a year.
That is why the next stage of the negotiations has to focus
on curtailing the means of production. In other words, the reactor in Arak needs
to be shut down and the number of centrifuges operating needs to be scaled back
significantly. The Iranians don’t want to give that at the opening stage of the
talks, and for good reason. As long as their production facilities are operating
at their current rate, the threat of a nuclear Iran will continue to hover over
our heads.
UNDER DURESS
Yedioth Ahronoth, 21 Oct 2013, Nahum Barnea
The prime minister’s father dedicated years of his life to
studying the Conversos in Spain. The Conversos [anusim in Hebrew,
meaning “forced”—INT] were Jews who converted to Christianity, but continued to
long secretly for their old religion. They worshipped one God outside, and
another God in their cellar.
There are cases in which a father’s
research topics are passed on to his son. This may be what happened to Benzion
Netanyahu’s son, the politician. He opposed the Oslo Accords and signed the Wye
River Memorandum and the Hebron agreement; he opposed the disengagement from
Gaza and voted in favor of it; he opposed the Shalit deal and embraced it
warmly; he opposed the release of prisoners who were citizens of Israel and
prisoners with blood on their hands as a gesture to Abu Mazen and agreed to
this; he opposed Karnit Flug’s appointment as governor of the Bank of Israel and
after four months of embarrassing delays, gave his blessing to the
appointment.
This, more or less, is how the Conversos managed to survive
in hostile surroundings. Some of them produced a fairly successful career from
their double lives.
There is nothing wrong with a pragmatic
prime minister, who understands that in real life one cannot get everything one
wants. Sometimes one has to swallow a bitter pill, sometimes one has to
compromise. Netanyahu’s problem is the gap between his self-image, of a macho
man, a firm and determined individual, whose principles are more important to
him than his seat—and his behavior in reality. “The prime minister instructed,” “the prime minister
decided,” “the prime minister guided,” say the statements that are issued by his
bureau. There is no chance that a statement will ever be issued saying that
“the prime minister was compelled,” “the prime minister changed his mind,” “the
prime minister was forced.”
Netanyahu’s determination dissipates as soon as it
becomes clear to him that if he continues to persist he will pay a personal
price. This is his breaking point. He is not the only politician who acts this
way; if he is different from others, he is different in the effort he invests in
repression.
Unfortunately, the process that Netanyahu undergoes time
and again is not a state secret. The Iranian enemy knows, and that is why it
responds dismissively to the threats from Israel; the American ally knows, and
that is why John Kerry threatens to bring the faltering negotiations with the
Palestinians to the moment of truth, the moment in which he will force Abu Mazen
and Netanyahu to pay the price for evading decisions; and the ultra-right wing
branch of the Likud also knows, and is preparing for
battle.
Zeev Elkin, Yariv Levin and their friends do not rely on
Netanyahu’s hawkish statements and his staying power. On the contrary, they
rely on his weakness. They believe that they will fend off the pressure that
the Americans will apply to him by means of threats of their own. Prior to the
end of the six months of negotiations the Americans will demand that Netanyahu
withdraw from more areas of the West Bank or accept a Security Council
resolution on the establishment of a Palestinian state. They believe that when
Netanyahu is between a rock and a hard place, and has to choose between a crisis
with the US and removal from the Likud, he will give in to
them.
To this day it is not known why Netanyahu disqualified
Karnit Flug. It is easier to know why he changed his mind: He understood that
the sudden downturn in public support for Yair Lapid and his party was forcing
Lapid to insist. [Lapid] desperately needed a victory. And Netanyahu realized
that the public was casting most of the responsibility for the farce upon him.
Ninety-nine percent of the Israelis have no idea who Eckstein, Blejer, Medina or
Flug are, or what the differences between them are. They expect their prime
minister to make a decision. And when they believe that the decision pertains
to their pocket, they are particularly agitated.
Flug acted correctly when she decided to overlook the
affront and take the post. Losers are offended. Winners have the last word.
She does not owe her appointment to anyone, and that is an excellent start for
the governor of a central bank.
LIVING WITH THE BOMB
Yedioth Ahronoth, 21 Oct 2013, Yaron London
“God is in the details”; experts have repeatedly used this
cliche when talking about the agreement being worked out between Iran and the
world powers. With all due respect, I believe that dealing with the details
obscures the trend to which the thinking mind should be paying attention. The
trend is brokering a compromise between the world powers and Iran, and
preserving the Shiite state’s ability to build a nuclear weapon when it so
chooses. Will Israel suffer critical harm?
The most horrific possibility is that the leaders of
Iran, who prophecy an apocalypse from which a world subject to God’s rule will
arise, will inflict a nuclear blow upon us without taking into consideration
what will happen to their country. The four horsemen of the apocalypse also
ride in the minds of Christian fundamentalists, most of whom pose as Israel’s
friends, and they appear in a similar version in the visions of delusional
Israelis, those who wish to demolish the mosques on the Temple
Mount.
The vision of the Day of Judgment, not as a death wish
but as a last choice, has also filtered into Israeli strategic thinking. The
proof of this was given in the past few days, in the series of films about the
Yom Kippur War that was aired on Channel One. The rumors about Moshe Dayan’s
request to consider the use of nuclear weapons were confirmed in the filmed
testimony of Ornan Azaryahu, the aide of then-minister Yisrael
Galili.
This disclosure does not harm
Israel’s power of deterrence, because it teaches our enemies that the “Samson
Option” is not an empty phrase. The chance that the Iranians will cut their own
throats just to see our throats cut is comparable to the chance that a meteor
will strike and destroy all life on earth. There is very little to do in
order to fend off the cosmic danger, whereas we have been able to distance the
Iranian peril, according to foreign reports, by means known as a “second strike
capability.” These are enough to reinforce the rational elements in the Iranian
leadership. Of course, one could write a script about a paranoid ayatollah who
takes control of the nuclear trigger, but the history of the Cold War has proven
that even ideological zealots are reluctant to turn the earth into
dust.
Another threat that Israel foresees is granting immunity
to actions against Israel under the cover of an Iranian nuclear umbrella. This
strategy, of a war of attrition by proxy, was adopted by the two superpowers in
the Cold War era, but the lesson is that the proxies fought as if there were no
nuclear powers backing them. The US did not withdraw from Vietnam for fear of a
Soviet offensive, and the Soviet Union did not pull out of Afghanistan due to
fear of ballistic missiles that could be fired from American silos. Nuclear
deterrence will not reduce Israel’s ability to strike at Hizbullah, or at Iran’s
agents in Syria.
Another more feasible possibility is that the Sunni Arab states will have an
incentive to develop their own nuclear weapons. A large number of players
holding weapons of mass destruction increases the chance of an accident due to a
technical failure, misreading the enemy’s intentions, or lethal materials
falling into the hands of terror organizations. It is not pleasant to live in
an environment in which some of the residents hold nuclear weapons, but the
paradox is that an intensification of the threat could extricate us from our
loneliness. Israel has long since
explained that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons endangers the entire world,
but our argument has not motivated the world powers to take violent preemptive
action. The situation will change as the danger grows. A nuclear expanse that
extends from Afghanistan to Cairo could convince the world where Israel has
failed to convince it.
Meanwhile, under the surface, a
positive development from our point of view is taking place: The Sunni Arab
states are forced to rely on the West and are strengthening their ties with
Israel. The Palestinian problem is being relegated to the sidelines and this
reality enables Israel to cope with it under reduced pressure. A separate
question pertains to our ability and willingness to take advantage of the window
of opportunity that has opened for us.
ALONE AND ISOLATED
Ma’ariv, 20 Oct 2013, Shalom Yerushalmi
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu walked slowly up to the
speaker’s podium in the Knesset on Monday. While in his seat in the plenum, he
had pored over what he was going to say until the last moment, changing and
correcting, erasing and adding, occasionally asking his neighbor, Defense
Minister Moshe Yaalon—perhaps his only serious support left today in the
government—for advice. On
the podium, Netanyahu, as is his wont, gave a forceful speech on the Iranian
issue, essentially continuing the aggressive tone with which his associate Tzahi
Hanegbi had begun the interview with him which appeared in Ma’ariv last
week (“Israel can and must attack Iran,” Hanegbi
said.)
At the end of the speech, Netanyahu
addressed the Palestinian issue. Here too, the prime minister sent even more
aggressive messages than in the past, which even earned the praise of Coalition
Chairman MK Yariv Levin, the Likud ideologue. “On the security level, it is
becoming increasingly clear just how correct is our demand that in any
arrangement, Israel be able to defend itself on its own,” the prime minister
said. “While the Palestinians are
demanding of us that we recognize the state of the Palestinian people, they
refuse to recognize the state of the Jewish people. What’s so complicated about
recognizing that simple historic fact?” Netanyahu
asked.
The simple fact is: Binyamin
Netanyahu is in his most difficult position since the Western Wall tunnel affair
during his first term, in September 1996. Netanyahu is not just alone, as
described by the New York Times; he is isolated. The Americans are
deserting him and joining the Iranian charm offensive in
Geneva. A military strike by Obama? Nothing seems further away
today. The negotiations with the Palestinians, having just begun, are in a
serious crisis, and the talks are about to explode. Netanyahu understands this
perfectly and is looking for footholds. His aggressive speech in the Knesset was
also a call of despair to his fellow Likud members: “I want to come back home.
Take me in.”
On Tuesday, the Ma’ariv headline reported, for
the first time, what is really happening in the talks with the Palestinians.
Let’s review the main points. The sides began to discuss the core issues:
borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, etc. The issue of the borders quickly
dominated the talks. It began when the Palestinians requested that the Israelis
show them a map of the Palestinian state they intend to give them. The Israelis
refused. They demanded to first discuss the ways in which the potential borders
could be defended, before drawing them, and to reach an understanding on the
security arrangements that Israel demands.
A discussion began. The Israelis demanded that the IDF
be permanently deployed along the Jordanian border. The Palestinians demanded
that their forces alone be stationed in the Jordan Valley along the border, the
way every country defends its independent borders. The Israelis refused
outright. “We can give you a demilitarized country, without weapons,” they said.
The Palestinians were outraged. “What is a demilitarized country? A prison?
We’ll be closed to the east and to the west, with no airspace, no deep sea port,
under your daily supervision. We prefer the present situation.”
[…]
The Next Step
On
Monday, shortly after the prime minister’s speech, the diligent Al-Jazeera
correspondent, Elias Karam, interviewed Nimr Hammad, Abu Mazen’s political
advisor and his closest associate. Hammad admitted the talks had stalled
because of the Israelis’ positions. Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the PLO
Central Committee, was more decisive and detailed in her response. “Netanyahu
wants to control the Palestinian state and its borders, border crossings and
airspace, and flatly refuses to discuss the possibility of an international
force in the Jordan Valley,” she said. “We cannot agree to this. From our point
of view, this is a redefinition of the Israeli occupation, which wants to
continue controlling our lives. We will not accept this in any
form.”
“All the talks focus on Israel’s
security issues,” Ashrawi added. “Israel insists, entrenches itself in its
positions and continues building settlements. The negotiations have produced no
result so far.” The talks have reached an impasse, but what both Netanyahu and
the Palestinians understood perfectly seems to have escaped Justice Minister
Tzippi Livni, who is leading the negotiations. Livni gave an interview to
Army Radio yesterday, but refused to give details about what was going on behind
the close doors. She merely said that Israel had learned the lessons of the
disengagement from Gaza, and will be able to protect its borders in the future.
Livni, as well as Minister Amir Peretz, a member of her party, claimed that
progress had been made in the talks.
Back to Netanyahu.
The prime minister once considered, not long ago, splitting the Likud and
running in a different political constellation. He raised the idea in
discussions with several ministers. Later he realized that dismantling the
reactor at Natanz would be easier than dismantling his own party, and that only
a few would join him should he attempt to walk the moderate path of Ariel
Sharon. Netanyahu tried, as we remember, to compete with Deputy Defense Minister
Danny Danon for the Likud presidency, and after weighing his chances, backed
down. These actions awakened the grass roots Likud against Netanyahu.
Meanwhile, the party’s
three most important institutions have been taken over by three men who oppose
any compromise with the Palestinians—Minister Yisrael Katz and Deputy Ministers
Zeev Elkin and Danon. These three, with the others, set Netanyahu limited room
to maneuver in the peace process.
The release of the prisoners in
mid-August in exchange for the renewal of the peace talks was, it appears, a
dramatic turning point in Netanyahu’s term. The Americans discerned
that the prime minister was ready to make far-reaching concessions, and perhaps
an opportunity to sever him from the right in favor of the negotiations with
Palestinians. Netanyahu felt trapped. He will not accept Palestinian
demands in the Jordan Valley a long time before the essentials talks are held on
the right of return, Jerusalem and the settlements. The Palestinians refuse
even to lease the Jordan Valley to Israel. According to one senior official, Netanyahu regrets the
prisoner release. Even the Americans have despaired of him. Yair Lapid, who was
in the US last week and met with senior administration officials there, can’t
stop talking about how Vice President Joe Biden said to him, you’re the next
thing.”
Since there is no point to the
negotiations, Netanyahu does not want to also lose his political base. Today, he
needs the Likud more than he ever did. These are no longer the days when
he could make, with ease, any political combination he wanted, as he did with
the Gesher and Tzomet parties before the 1992 elections. Today, he is
menaced by Avigdor Lieberman, who is threatening to dismantle his coalition
unless he becomes an integral part of the Likud. Netanyahu wants to force this
alliance on his fellow party members, but before doing so, he must change his
tune [on making peace]. MKs Elkin, Danon Hotovely, Levin, Feiglin and the others
repeatedly say, “anyone who gives up [parts of the Land of Israel] will be left
outside.” Netanyahu doesn’t want to be outside anymore, but rather inside, deep
inside.
The possible failure of the talks
with the Palestinians will be Netanyahu’s renewed entrance ticket into his
enraged party. Expect a Likud Central Committee at which Netanyahu will give a
festive speech and announce: “I did not concede, neither on Israel’s borders nor
on its security. I remained faithful to the Likud’s principles.” The ceiling of
the conference hall will fly off, and with it, the peace process and relations
with the United States. How did Netanyahu put it? “If we remain alone, we’ll
manage alone.” It seems he was right. […]
CUP OF POISON
Yedioth Ahronoth, 18 Oct 2013, Shimon Shiffer
“I drank the cup of poison,” said Iran’s
spiritual leader Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, describing his consent to a
cease-fire in the bloody war with Iraq. Now, with an ironic smile, it can be
said that the talks between the Islamic republic and the world powers will also
require Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to drink the cup of poison that the
parties have designated for him—the world, so it seems, has turned in Iran’s
direction.
The two days of talks that were held this week in Geneva
between representatives of the world powers and their counterparts from Iran,
which discussed the suspension of the Iranian nuclear project in exchange for
lifting the sanctions imposed by the West on the ayatollah regime in Tehran,
left decision-makers in Israel troubled, concerned—and mainly in the dark.
However, it can already be assumed that no agreement that will be reached at the
end of the talks will cause officials in Jerusalem to smile, and it will be
implemented in spite of Israel’s objections.
However, a high-ranking
political-security official in Israel who is privy to the secret discussions on
the Iranian threat explained that focusing on the agreement for suspending the
nuclear project misses the real story. He said that the focus is the talks
between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman—who is
nicknamed “the killer” behind her back—and senior Iranian official Abbas
Araghchi. These two are full partners to three secret dialogue channels that
were established in the past year between the US and Iran, the aim of which is
to examine the possibility of normalization between Washington and Tehran. “The
Americans carefully safeguard the content of the talks with the Iranians,” says
the high-ranking Israeli official. “They don’t tell us what is happening there,
and they don’t tell the British and the French
either.”
As far as the nuclear program is concerned, Israeli
officials assess that a guiding principle for an agreement is being worked out
in the talks between the Americans and the Iranians: President Barack Obama’s
administration will permit the government in Tehran to continue enriching
uranium to a 3.5% level, in exchange for their willingness to stop the
enrichment to a 20% level and in exchange for opening their nuclear facilities
to international inspection. And if that were not enough, the Americans are
also willing to examine a reduction of the economic sanctions and a series of
humanitarian relief measures, in the context of good will gestures and
confidence building measures. For example, the US could unfreeze some of the
assets and funds, valued at trillions of dollars, which are held in banks in the
US and were confiscated after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. The
Israeli official said, “this rapprochement between Washington and Tehran is a
cause of genuine concern for us.” […]
Netanyahu, for his part, intends to tell US Secretary of
State John Kerry next week in their meeting in Rome that Israel will do
everything in its power to prevent changes in the sanctions regime. Netanyahu
and Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon, who met with his American counterpart and
with top CIA officials, demanded that [the US] insist on having the Iranians
stop the uranium enrichment to a 20% level before any consent is given to ease
the sanctions. In addition, Israel is demanding to remove from Iran the
centrifuges already manufactured and to close the nuclear sites in Fordow,
Parchin and Arak.
“Will there be an agreement in the end?” I asked a
Western diplomat who met the Iranian team to the talks. “It’s not at all
certain,” he replied. “They are negotiating in the salami method, and they
discern a strong desire, even haste, on the part of the world powers [to reach
an agreement]. But it should be remembered that the agreement will only reach
fruition after they sign it—and it should be made clear to the Iranians that if
they try to deceive us, they will be punished by the destruction of the
facilities that they tried to build under the cover of the
negotiations.”
DÉJÀ VU IN GENEVA
Ma’ariv, 17 Oct 2013, Dr. Emily Landau (The author is the director of
the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National
Security Studies)
The talks in Geneva ended with a
joint announcement to the press, and as could be expected, with optimistic
statements about the expected progress and expectation of another meeting in a
few weeks in order to examine the technical details of the various proposals in
depth. What we did not hear were many details about the actual proposals. If
that sounds familiar, that’s because there was a similar dynamic in the past.
Except for the more relaxed tones and the demonstratively positive approach,
there is nothing significant of substance this time that we didn’t have in the
previous rounds in 2012 and earlier this year in the talks in
Kazakhstan. Gary Samore, until recently the key person in the
Obama administration for the Iranian issue, is of the impression that there is
no significant change in the Iranian proposal compared to previous proposals in
the past, when Ahmadinejad was Iranian president.
One principal question has to be at the heart of the
negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue: this question is not whether Iran
is willing to make preliminary concessions in the nuclear context, but rather
whether it has made a decision to back down from its plan to develop a military
nuclear capability. It’s a bit hard to conduct negotiations
on something that Iran fervently says that it is not doing and never did. And
that’s why, in order to examine the matter, it is necessary to translate what is
fairly obvious that Iran is doing in the nuclear context—i.e., taking steps to
develop military nuclear capability—into specific issues relating to the most
problematic aspects of its plan. And it is on these matters that there must be
insistence, before thinking of easing the
sanctions.
The correct way to examine the talks
is through the prism of the art of negotiation. As long as there is no
indication that Iran has changed direction in its nuclear plans and has decided
to give up its intent to develop military nuclear capability, all of its
proposals should be seen as tactical steps in the negotiations with the
international community. Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that Iran’s
main goal in these talks is to lift the painful sanctions. It wants to make the
minimum concessions in its nuclear program and to get maximum easing of the
economic and financial sanctions. Iran has probably also realized that
tactically, it is more effective to show a welcoming face than a defiant one.
One can propose insignificant concessions with a smile, and this makes it harder
for the other side to turn these concessions down.
And what about Israel’s position? As part of the Iranian
tactics, if Israel is perceived as being the only one that is vehemently opposed
to what is taking place in the talks, it will be easy to push its arguments to
the sidelines and to portray it as a side whose positions do not correspond to
those of the rest of the world. In this context, it should be mentioned that
Israel’s positions, as presented by Netanyahu in New York a few weeks ago,
correspond in full to the declared positions of the US, including the matter of
not enriching uranium in Iranian territory, as stated by Susan Rice at the end
of September this year. Israel’s frustration is
understandable: it is not sitting at the negotiating table with Iran but will
particularly suffer from the negative consequences of a “bad deal” with it. That
said, it is better not to stand out in such a way that makes it easier for Iran
to push Israel to the sidelines; Israel should relay its principal messages to
the countries leading the talks by quiet means.
SENIOR ISRAELI POLITICAL OFFICIAL:
ERDOGAN IS A MEMBER OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The exchange of blows between Ankara and
Jerusalem escalated last night. A high-ranking Israeli political official
lambasted the Turks over the exposure of the spy ring in Iran. “Erdogan is a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a supporter of Hamas and is anti-Israel, not
to say an anti-Semite, he has no real intention of rehabilitating relations
with us,” said the high-ranking political official to Channel Ten News. “We have
no expectations from him.”
MK Avigdor Lieberman, the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee, said last night that Turkey was not interested in
improving relations with Israel. “I believed that the apology for the flotilla
would only damage Israel’s standing in the region and would play into the hands
of the extremist elements in the Middle East, among which Turkey under Erdogan,
the extremist Islamist,” wrote Lieberman on Facebook. “I am not surprised by
Turkey’s accusations as if Israel were behind the report in the Washington
Post, and I don’t know if there even was such a spy ring,” wrote Lieberman
in a first public comment on the issue by an Israeli
official.
“This Turkish accusation, as if Israel were behind the
report so as to avoid paying compensation to the participants of the Marmara
flotilla, like the previous accusation as if Israel had been behind the riots by
Turkish demonstrators in Taksim Square and Erdogan’s comments about how he has
‘documents and proof’ that Israel was behind the coup in Egypt, is devoid of any
basis and proves once again that Turkey under Erdogan’s leadership is not
interested in improving relations with Israel,” wrote
Lieberman.
“That is why I hope that we will all stop deluding
ourselves and understand the reality in which we live and the difference between
what we’d like to exist and what does exist,” wrote Lieberman in conclusion. “My
opposition to the apology to Turkey is not new and I expressed it clearly both
before and after it was done.”
Turkish intelligence officials claimed that Israel was
responsible for the report, and said that they believed this was a campaign that
Israel was staging in order to avoid having to pay damages to the victims of the
flotilla to Gaza as Israel undertook to do. According to a report in the Turkish
newspaper Hurriyet, officials in Ankara drew a link between this most
recent report and other reports in the American media against the Turkish
intelligence service.
Senior Israeli official: The Director of Turkish
Intelligence is an Anti-Semite
While Turkey began to intimate that “forces in the
region” that wanted to sabotage Turkey’s standing in the Middle East had brought
about the report because of the “moderate political atmosphere in the aftermath
of Hassan Rouhani’s election,” a high-ranking Israeli security official fired
back in the direction of Hakan Fidan, the director of the Turkish intelligence
agency, MIT. According to the report in the Washington Post, Fidan has
close ties with the regime in Tehran.
According to the report, Israeli intelligence officials
referred to Fidan in in conversations with the Americans as the head of Iranian
intelligence in Ankara. “Hakan Fidan is an anti-Semite and an Islamist who
consorts with the worst of our enemies,” the high-ranking security official told
Channel Ten News. “With Fidan it isn’t that we need to respect and suspect him,
but that we need to suspect and suspect him, and the spirit of his leadership is
anti-Semitic and Islamist.”
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS ALREADY
HERE
Ma’ariv, 20 Oct 2013, Amnon Lord
The road to a final status arrangement
runs through an interim agreement. And the existing interim agreement appears to
be the final status arrangement. The more details we hear—if you call the highly
partial leaks from the negotiations’ “details” —the stronger the impression that
Israel is demanding that which it now has. It is not insisting on sovereignty in
the Jordan Valley, but talks of “leasing.” And after all, doesn’t Israel
currently control the Jordan Valley—albeit without a lease, but without
sovereignty either?
The addition to the status quo must make the current
agreement dynamic, i.e., it has to initiate a process whereby the longer the
security situation stays calm, and the deeper that calm is, the more “rights”
are given to the Palestinians. It goes without saying that a situation in which
Israel is the side that “grants” rights to the Palestinians is no good. It’s an
unnatural and unjust situation, but it’s a process that
works.
In the end, a situation has to be
reached in which the Palestinians have a degree of freedom of movement which,
even if not complete, is more or less on the level of that of the Jews—in all
parts of the State of Israel. The preference will be that there be more sources
of income and development in the territories of the Palestinian Authority, so
that people prefer to work within its borders. And the same goes for the area of
Israeli legal jurisdiction.
All this, in a dynamic process
initiated from our side. After all, we will have no choice but to confront
reality. The Palestinian side won’t help us reach that interim agreement in
which Israel really does give up territories, but without giving the
Palestinians everything they demand. It seems that the son of an Arab, of
a Christian and my son will be able to live together in relative freedom and
security only under the conditions existing today.
One could almost say that Netanyahu’s peace is a peace
of trial and error—without carrying out large experiments on human beings:
checking what works but without evacuating [territories] and without losing
control of the security situation. At the other end of the spectrum is the
method of “agreement at any price.” More and more, it seems that this method
leads to an explosion. Its adherents are very strong forces within Israel and
obviously also on the American side.
When the Palestinians
oppose an idea put forward by Israel, according to last week’s reports, they
apparently rely on an understanding with the Americans, for example, on the
issue of the Jordan Valley. But the Americans apparently have a similar tendency
with regard to any territory Israel might cede: they speak of “foreign forces”
that will buttress security in the Jordan Valley and the other areas. This is
completely in opposition to one of the principles outlined by
Netanyahu.
Conclusion: when Abu Mazen rejects an
Israeli proposal for a long-term lease, he does so under American cover. This is
not the most important issue in the negotiations, but it demonstrates how far
apart the two sides’ positions are and how impossible it is, today, to reach the
final status arrangement the international community is talking
about. True, it’s good that negotiations are happening. But we
shouldn’t take them too seriously. It’s not that the two-state solution is
dead. The story is a bit different: the Palestinian moment in history was
missed. The Palestinians had their moment in history, and it wasn’t during the
Olmert period. It was in Camp David in July of 2000. The moment came and Arafat
made his decision: he embarked on a war of terror. Ever since, the
Palestinian issue has been fading, with moments of high and low tide, and even
if they return to the option so many Israelis are afraid of—a renewed appeal to
the UN and international institutions—it will be nothing more than political
harassment.
PALESTINIANS REFUSED ISRAELI PROPOSAL
TO LEASE THE JORDAN VALLEY
Ma’ariv, 17 Oct 2013,
Shalom Yerushalmi
Ma’ariv has learned that Israel
proposed to the Palestinians during the negotiations that Israel transfer the
Jordan Valley to them but lease it from them for decades. The Palestinians
adamantly refused, and the Jordanians also refused an Israeli demand to deploy
the IDF along the border. “No Israeli soldiers will be there,” said yesterday
Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Fatah Central Committee. “We will not agree to
[Israeli] control and we will not lease land. We will not take part in
redefining the Israeli occupation.”
Ma’ariv reported first on
Tuesday, that the talks with the Palestinians were on the verge of breaking up
because of the Jordan Valley, only two months after starting. This came after
the sides started to discuss the core issues: borders, Jerusalem, refugees,
settlements and more. The issue of borders very quickly took up most of the
talks, after the Palestinians demanded of the Israelis that they show a map of
the state they are willing to give them. The Israelis demanded that they talk
about ways to defend the borders before drawing them up, and to reach
understandings on the issue of the security
arrangements.
In the course of the meeting, the Israelis demanded that
the IDF be permanently deployed on the border with Jordan. The Palestinians
demanded that only their forces be deployed on the Jordan Valley border. The
Israelis firmly refused. “We are willing to let you have a demilitarized state,
without weapons,” they said. The Palestinians were outraged. “What is a
demilitarized state? A cage? We will be closed from the east and from the west,
with no air space, with no deep water port, with daily supervision by you. Even
the current situation is better,” they replied. “The Americans’ attempts to talk
about international forces were flatly rejected by Israel. “In any arrangement,
Israel must be able to defend itself with its own forces, against any threat,
without relying on foreign forces,” Netanyahu made the Israeli position clear on
Monday in his Knesset speech.
At some stage the Israelis on the
negotiating team raised a surprising solution: Israel would lease the Jordan
Valley for decades from the PA. Such an arrangement exists between Israel and
Jordan, which signed a peace agreement in October 1994. According to that
agreement, Israel leases a 400 square kilometer enclave in the Arava, and in the
Naharayim area. The Palestinians also refused this proposal. Two days ago, in an
interview to Al-Jazeera, Abu Mazen’s adviser and his closest associate, Nimr
Hamad, said that the negotiations were in crisis because of the Israelis’
positions.
Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Fatah Central Committee,
confirmed the exclusive report in Ma’ariv. “Netanyahu wants to control
the Palestinian state and its borders, the crossings and the air space, and
adamantly refuses to discuss the possibility of deploying international forces
in the Jordan Valley,” she said. “We cannot agree to this. As far as we are
concerned, this would be redefining the Israeli occupation which wants to
besiege us again and control our lives. We will not accept this in any form.”
She said, “all the talks are focusing on issues of Israel’s security. Israel is
being insistent, is hunkering down in its positions and continues to build
settlements. The negotiations have not yet led to
anything.”
Matters have reached an impasse, but what Netanyahu and
the Palestinians realize very well, seems to have gone unnoticed by Justice
Minister Tzippi Livni, who is heading the talks for Israel. Livni said after
the Ma’ariv report that this was gossip. Yesterday Minister Amir Peretz,
from Livni’s party, said that there was progress in the talks. “I am
optimistic,” Peretz said. Happy is he who believes.
NEW ISRAELI PROPOSAL IN NEGOTIATIONS
WITH PALESTINIANS: ANNEXATION FOR ANNEXATION
Makor Rishon, 17 Oct 2013, Ariel Kahane
A new Israeli proposal has been put
forward in an attempt to advance the negotiations with the Palestinians in light
of the impasse that apparently has been reached in the talks. The Israeli
political echelon has begun to examine new ideas that might allow for some
agreements, even limited agreements, to be reached with the Palestinians, since
a final status arrangement and even an interim agreement appear now to be out of
reach, so as to prevent the talks from dying. Makor Rishon has learned
that one of the proposals being considered by Israel is “annexation in exchange
for annexation,” which means receiving Palestinian consent for Israel to annex
certain parts of Judea and Samaria in exchange for turning other areas over to
Palestinian control.
At this stage, the idea is a general one, but an Israeli
source spoke with Makor Rishon about the possibility of annexing the
Etzion Bloc in exchange for turning over territory in the Nablus area to the
Palestinians. It should be underscored that at issue is not the veteran idea of
a “land swap,” since that idea is predicated on Israel’s turning over land from
inside smaller [i.e., sovereign] Israel in exchange for recognition of the
settlement blocs.
A large number of Israeli sources have said that, for
the time being, the Livni-Erekat talks have yielded no results. The parties
repeat their consistent positions, and have been unable to bridge the
gaps.
The Israelis are searching for a way
to prevent the talks from being derailed in a manner that might result in the
blame being laid at Israel’s doorstep. Israeli officials are afraid of an
American position paper being presented towards the end of the period of time
that has been allotted to the talks, citing parameters [for a final status
arrangement] that will be difficult for Israel [to accept].
That said, Prime Minister Netanyahu has stressed in talks that he will not agree
to make any concessions on the issue of security. One of his demands has been a
lengthy Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, which is a position that the
Palestinians have rejected out of hand.
In light of the standstill in the
talks, Netanyahu has also said that he would be prepared and willing to try to
reach a temporary agreement with the Palestinians, but PA Chairman Abu Mazen has
remained firmly opposed to that option. It is against that backdrop, and
as a result of a desire to put an end to the one-sided pattern that was
established in the Oslo, in which Israel gave up territory and received nothing
palpable in return, that the above-cited proposal has come to be considered. The
chances of it’s being accepted do not appear to be very high for the time
being.
The assessment within the Israeli political
establishment is that once the period of time allotted to the negotiations draws
near, the Americans are likely to take far clearer positions on the content of
what they believe would be a desirable agreement and, by so doing, to place the
burden of blame, in practice, on one side.
EU AND ISRAEL DRAWING UP WAY TO BYPASS
SANCTIONS ON INSTITUTIONS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA
Ma’ariv, 17 Oct 2013, Eli Bardenstein
The EU is cooperating with Israel in an attempt to find a
solution to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the European Commission on
funding for Israeli institutions working beyond the Green Line. The main reason
that the Europeans are seeking a way to back down, at least partially, is
because they want to see Israel taking part in the huge Horizon 2020 science
project, which is one of the EU’s flagship
programs.
Europe cannot cancel the sanctions,
and that’s why both sides are looking for creative solutions that will make it
possible to have it both ways —in other words, keep the sanctions in place but
get around them by various means. The first idea, raised by
the Israeli side, is meant to find a solution to the European demand that any
institution that desires funding must declare that it does not work beyond the
Green Line and undertake that the money it receives will only be used for
activity within the Green Line. The Foreign Ministry proposed that the European
Commission decide what the location is of any institution requesting funding
based on the zip code of its main place of activity. A high-ranking
official in Jerusalem explained that this proposal places the burden of proof on
the Europeans. So instead of the Israeli institution’s having to prove that it
is not active beyond the 1967 borders, the Europeans would be the ones to check
this.
The second proposal, made by the European side, has to
do with funding for Israeli institutions that have only limited and indirect
activity beyond the Green Line—for example, banks that have branches in East
Jerusalem, gas companies with stations in Judea and Samaria, health funds,
supermarket chains, the Israel Postal Company, academic centers, and more.
According to the current rules, such institutions are not eligible for funding.
The Europeans are proposing that these institutions set up subsidiaries for the
projects for which they are asking funding, and thus bypass the
problem.
Despite the mutual wish to resolve the problems, there
are still disagreements. The Europeans say that the zip code method proposed by
Israel does not really ensure that institutions seeking funding are only active
inside the Green Line, whereas Israel claims that the idea of subsidiaries is
not practical for small companies, which would find this difficult to achieve.
That said, the fact that both sides are cooperating and want to solve the
problem before the European Commission guidelines go into effect in January
2014, are grounds for optimism.
The main catalyst to an agreement between the sides is,
as said, the Horizon 2020 project. The Europeans very much want Israel to take
part in this scientific project because of its proven ability in this sphere. If
the cooperation works out, Israel will transfer more than 600 million euros to
the EU project over the next seven years, but in return, will receive about one
billion euros for scientific and technological
projects.
In meetings that were held at the Foreign Ministry and
in the Prime Minister’s Bureau after the European Commission issued its
guidelines, all agreed that Israel could not sign new agreements with the EU
based on these directives. On the other hand, Israel recognizes that it is not
possible to cancel them officially, and that in any case, cooperation with the
EU cannot be halted because of them. That is why it was decided to seek creative
solutions, and Jerusalem is encouraged by the fact that the Europeans have
reached a similar conclusion.
One of the
signs that cooperation between Israel and the EU can be expected to continue is
the scheduled visit on Sunday of EU Commission Vice President for Industry and
Entrepreneurship Antonio Tajani. Tajani will arrive in Israel accompanied by 65
representatives of European companies and industrial organizations with the goal
of encouraging business cooperation between the sides. In the course of his
visit Tajani will meet with President Shimon Peres and with ministers Silvan
Shalom, Uzi Landau and Naftali Bennett.
THE RUSSIAN BEAR RETURNS TO THE MIDDLE
EAST
Ma’ariv, 18 Oct,
2013, Eli Bardenstein
In the wake of the weaker relations between the US and the
new government in Egypt, Russia is expected to try to fill, at least partially,
the vacuum left by Washington. It is common knowledge that during the Cold War,
the USSR provided Egypt with economic, political and military aid; this time
around—it is important to note—Russia’s support is to a lesser extent, yet the
Russians are nevertheless determined to strengthen their position in the region,
and are willing to invest efforts and resources to do so. Moscow is now taking steps to
reestablish its standing in the Middle East, and Egypt is emerging as the
central axis of its diplomatic maneuvers.
As will be recalled, Washington announced that it was
freezing military aid to Egypt because of its displeasure with the military
government’s actions against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Obama administration
considers these actions as directly contradicting the basic premises of the
democracy that it hopes will arise in Egypt. In addition, the Russian success in
Syria, where the Kremlin’s initiative led to a deal between the US and the Assad
regime on the chemical weapons, raised Russia’s standing in the region, to the
detriment of Washington, and encouraged the Russians to strive more
energetically to reoccupy their historical position in the Middle
East.
Egypt, the largest and most important Arab country, is a
natural target for Russia. “US-Egypt relations are going through a crisis that
is likely to harm the entire Middle East,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy
told the Egyptian Al-Ahramnewspaper. From the Russians’ point of view,
this is an opportunity. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is scheduled to
visit Cairo at the beginning of November, and a visit by President Putin may
follow.
Director of the Russian MFA Department for Middle East
Sergey Vershinin raised the issue of the US freezing its aid to Egypt in
meetings held in Israel this week, and expressed deep anxiety that if the
Egyptians did not receive the money from some alternate source, the country’s
already weak economic situation would deteriorate even further, leading to
instability. He confirmed to his Israeli interlocutors that Foreign Minister
Lavrov would indeed visit Cairo soon, and even mentioned Russia’s intention to
renew and upgrade its cooperation with Egypt. At the same time, Vershinin
stressed that Moscow would not be able to restore the level of support afforded
to Egypt in the past by the USSR. “We won’t go back to the days when we built
the Aswan Dam,” he said in talks with his Israeli counterparts. […]
Even though officials in Jerusalem harbor fears that
Russia will reassume a full-scale role in the Middle East, the Russians have
made it clear that in at least one area, it relations with Israel will not be
harmed: that of economic cooperation, which they consider to be of prime
importance. Putin himself raised this issue in a meeting with Netanyahu in Sochi
last year, and the prime minister is expected to convene a joint economic
committee, with the participation of both countries, in November.